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PROTECTING MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS IN ALASKA 
CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
KEITH ROGERS* 
 The lack of case law in Alaska concerning close corporations, 
combined with recent supreme court decisions and statutory 
changes, has made for a confusing state of the law with respect to 
close corporations.  This Comment outlines the nature of close 
corporations and the particular issues that they face, and it 
discusses the recent Alaska Supreme Court decisions in the 
Coppock cases.  The Comment then offers a suggestion for how 
Alaska should proceed in changing and clarifying the state of 
close corporation law. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Alaska is one of the youngest and least populous states in the 
Union.  It should therefore come as no surprise that Alaska case 
law on close corporations is exceedingly thin.  In fact, a case 
involving the protection of minority shareholders in close 
corporations did not come before the Alaska Supreme Court until 
1980.1  Perhaps also because of the state’s small size, Alaska’s 
statutes do not exhaustively cover topics relevant to minority 
shareholders.  Thus, in Alaska Plastics v. Coppock2 and Stefano v. 
Coppock,3 the supreme court had a great deal of freedom to 
formulate Alaska law on the subject.  Unfortunately, the court’s 
opinions in these cases, combined with recent statutory changes, 
leave one feeling confused about the current state of the law in 
Alaska.  This Comment critically examines these cases and statutes 
 
 * The author extends special thanks to the following: Prof. James D. Cox of 
Duke University School of Law for his guidance throughout the writing of this 
comment; Ken Rogers for suggesting helpful revisions; and Leni Perkins for 
overseeing the editing process. 
 1. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980). 
 2. Id. 
 3. 705 P.2d 443 (Alaska 1985). 
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and proposes a new framework within which Alaska should 
consider the rights of minority shareholders in close corporations. 
II.  THE NATURE OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
Close corporations differ from public corporations in a 
number of important respects.  Although there is no formal 
definition of a close corporation, close corporations are typified by 
a small number of shareholders, the absence of a market for the 
company’s stock, and substantial participation in the business of 
the corporation by shareholders.4 
A. Special Considerations of Close Corporations 
1. Relative Position of Minority Shareholders.  Close 
corporations present unique opportunities for the holders of a 
majority of the stock to burden the minority.  In public 
corporations, shareholders typically receive a return on their 
investment through capital gains upon the sale of their stock or 
through the payment of dividends.  In close corporations, however, 
there is by definition no ready public market for the sale of shares.5  
Also, shareholders in close corporations typically receive a return 
on their investment primarily through salaries as opposed to 
dividends.6  Consequently, a shareholder in a close corporation 
who is not employed by the corporation often has no way to earn a 
return on her investment.7  The majority shareholders can take 
advantage of this situation by offering to purchase the minority’s 
shares for an unfairly low price.8  In the absence of legal remedies, 
the minority shareholder might have no choice but to accept the 
unfair offer.9 
2. Restrictions on the Transfer of Shares.  Unlike shareholders 
in public corporations, shareholders in close corporations usually 
know and plan to work with all the other shareholders in the 
corporation.10  An investment in a close corporation can be thought 
of as part of a “package deal” in that an individual invests only in 
 
 4. E.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 N.E.2d 505, 
511 (Mass. 1975). 
 5. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 273. 
 6. 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS § 1.08 (3d ed. 1994). 
 7. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515. 
 8. See, e.g., id. 
 9. See, e.g., id. 
 10. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 6, §§ 1.02, 1.08. 
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contemplation of working with certain specific people in operating 
the business of the close corporation.11  Consequently, shareholders 
in close corporations may wish to restrict the ability of a fellow 
shareholder to transfer her shares to a third party.  Restrictions on 
the transfer of shares, often placed in the charter or by-laws, are a 
key part of close corporation planning.12  Although a basic principle 
of property law is that restrictions on the alienability of property 
are disfavored, several forms of restrictions on the transfer of 
shares are allowed.13  For example, a “right of first refusal” gives 
the corporation the right to purchase shares at the same price 
offered by any third party.14  Also, a “consent restraint” dictates 
that shares cannot be sold unless the corporation (in the form of 
fellow shareholders) gives its approval.15 
3. Shareholders Agreements.  A special problem of a close 
corporation is that it is frequently rational for the majority 
shareholders to “freeze out” a minority shareholder by using their 
voting power to deny the minority a return on her investment.  
Although a freeze-out may take many forms, the end result is the 
same regardless of the form taken: the majority rids itself of an 
unwanted minority shareholder.  In addition to relying on the 
fiduciary duties owed by the majority to the minority, a minority 
shareholder can protect herself by entering into a shareholders 
agreement at the onset of the corporation.16  These agreements can 
be placed in the charter or by-laws.17 
One example of a shareholders agreement is a voting 
agreement, in which a shareholder agrees to vote her shares a 
specific way.18  Voting agreements can cover a variety of areas, 
including management policy, deadlock, and dissolution.19  A 
buyout agreement is another way for a minority shareholder to 
 
 11. See Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The 
Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 757 (2000). 
 12. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 1.14. 
 13. All states permit certain restrictions on share transfers.  Id.  Some state 
statutes automatically prohibit share transfers in close corporations unless there is 
unanimous shareholder approval.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4-
501 (LexisNexis 1999). 
 14. 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 7.05. 
 15. Id. 
 16. 1 id. § 5.01. 
 17. 1 id. § 5.03. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See 1 id. § 5.02. 
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protect herself.20  It grants the shareholder the right to have her 
shares bought at a price determined by a method previously agreed 
to upon the happening of a specified event, such as the 
shareholder’s departure from the employ of the corporation.21  
Alternatively, a charter provision might grant a shareholder veto 
power over all key decisions,22 or an agreement may be made to 
compel dividends to be paid at specified intervals.23 
B. Sources of Relief for Minority Shareholders in Close 
Corporations 
1. The “Equal Opportunity” Principle.  Most courts hold that 
majority shareholders owe the minority a fiduciary duty.24  In many 
states, these fiduciary duties are enhanced in the close corporation 
context.25  This duty has been expressed as a duty of the “highest 
degree of honesty and good faith.”26  Some courts have even gone 
so far as to hold that shareholders in close corporations owe each 
other the same fiduciary duty as partners in a partnership.27 
The Massachusetts case of Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.28 
laid out a special rule concerning the fiduciary duty owed by a 
controlling shareholder in a close corporation to the minority.29  In 
Donahue, the directors of a close corporation caused the company 
to purchase the shares of a director who was also the firm’s largest 
shareholder.30  A minority shareholder sued to rescind the 
purchase.31  The court noted that while close corporations and 
partnerships share many similarities, the use of the corporate form 
 
 20. 2 id. § 9.06. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 1 id. § 3.41. 
 23. 2 id. § 9.05. 
 24. See, e.g., Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 472–74 (Cal. 1969); 
Guy v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1086, 1090 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
 25. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 515–16 
(Mass. 1975); Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (D. Pa. 1984) 
(“Adherence by the majority interest to a fiduciary duty of strict fairness is 
particularly critical in the context of the closely-held corporation.”). 
 26. Guy, 672 F. Supp. at 1090 (quoting Jaffe Commercial Finance Co. v. 
Harris, 456 N.E.2d 224, 230 (1983)). 
 27. See, e.g., Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515; Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167, 
171 (Miss. 1989); Estate of Schroer v. Stamco Supply, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 975, 981 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1984). 
 28. 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975). 
 29. Id. at 505–06. 
 30. Id. at 510. 
 31. Id. at 508. 
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gives directors of close corporations an opportunity to 
disadvantage the minority by, for example, refusing to declare 
dividends.32  While a partner can dissolve the partnership at any 
time, a minority shareholder of a close corporation has no market 
in which to sell her shares and can only achieve dissolution of the 
corporation by complying with the strict terms of a state’s 
dissolution statute.33  The result is that a minority shareholder is 
often forced to deal with the majority on the majority’s terms.34  
Because of this “inherent danger” to minority interests in a close 
corporation, the court held that shareholders in a close corporation 
owe each other the same fiduciary duty as partners, a duty of “the 
utmost good faith and loyalty.”35  The court contrasted this with the 
less stringent duty that applies to corporations generally.36  As part 
of this enhanced fiduciary duty, the court held that “the controlling 
group [in a close corporation] may not . . . utilize its control of the 
corporation to obtain special advantages and disproportionate 
benefit from its share ownership.”37  Applying this rule to the facts 
of the case, the court held that a controlling shareholder who 
causes the corporation to purchase his stock has violated his 
fiduciary duties unless the corporation offers to purchase the 
minority’s shares on the same terms.38  According to the court, 
there were two forms of appropriate relief for the plaintiffs in 
Donahue: (1) a remission of the money the defendant director 
received in exchange for the shares, and (2) an order that the 
corporation purchase the plaintiff’s shares on the same terms as 
those offered the defendant.39 
Another Massachusetts case, Wilkes v. Springside Nursing 
Home,40 was decided a year after Donahue and tilted the scales 
 
 32. Id. at 512–13. 
 33. Id. at 514. 
 34. Id. at 515. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 515–16 (“We contrast this strict good faith standard with the 
somewhat less stringent standard of fiduciary duty to which directors and 
stockholders of all corporations must adhere in the discharge of their corporate 
responsibilities.”). 
 37. Id. at 518. 
 38. Id. at 518–19. 
 39. Id. at 520–21 (granting the plaintiff both forms of relief).  A similar rule 
was adopted by the California Supreme Court in Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 
460 P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969).  In Ahmanson, the court held that majority shareholders 
owe a fiduciary obligation to the minority and that any use to which the majority 
puts the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportionately.  Ahmanson, 
460 P.2d at 471. 
 40. 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976). 
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back in favor of the majority shareholders.  The court in Wilkes 
balanced the strict “equal opportunity” principle espoused in 
Donahue with the right of a shareholder to vote her shares in her 
own self-interest.41  According to Wilkes, in order to show a breach 
of the fiduciary duty owed by the majority to the minority, a 
complaining shareholder first has the burden to show unequal 
treatment by the majority.42  Thereupon, the majority has an 
opportunity to show that there was a valid business purpose for the 
unequal treatment.43  If the majority can satisfy that burden, the 
minority then has the opportunity to show that the majority could 
have achieved its valid business purpose through an alternative less 
harmful to the minority.44  Applying this test, the Wilkes court 
concluded that a minority shareholder who had not been reelected 
as an officer and director of the corporation was entitled to recover 
the salary he would have received had he remained an officer and 
director.45 
Not all jurisdictions extend special protection to the 
shareholders of close corporations.  Delaware rejected the “equal 
opportunity” doctrine in Nixon v. Blackwell.46  In Nixon, minority 
non-employee shareholders of a close corporation47 who acquired 
their shares as a gift claimed that the directors, who were the 
majority shareholders, breached a fiduciary duty by implementing 
an employee stock ownership plan and key man life insurance 
programs that benefited employees of the corporation with no 
corresponding benefit to the plaintiffs.48  The court found that since 
the defendants stood to benefit from the programs, they stood “on 
both sides of the transaction.”49  Consequently, the court held that 
the defendants had the burden to demonstrate the “entire fairness” 
of the transactions.50  That burden was met by the defendants, who 
 
 41. Id. at 663. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 664–65. 
 46. 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). 
 47. The corporation did not, however, qualify for the special provisions of 
Subchapter XIV of the Delaware General Corporation Law.  Id. at 1380. 
 48. Id. at 1370–71. 
 49. Id. at 1375. 
 50. Id. at 1375–76. The court emphasized that this “entire fairness” standard 
was more onerous to the defendants than the business judgment rule because it 
requires judicial scrutiny of the transactions.  In other words, because the 
defendants stood on both sides of the transactions the court would not merely 
defer to the defendant directors’ judgment.  See id. 
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justified the discriminatory treatment on the basis that employees 
and not shareholders were being favored.51  The court rejected the 
notion that stockholders must always be treated equally for all 
purposes, emphasizing the distinction between fairness and 
equality.52  In essence, the court held that the plaintiffs did not 
deserve the same benefits given to other shareholders because the 
plaintiffs were not employees of the corporation.53 
2. Oppression.  The corporation statutes of many states allow 
a minority shareholder to seek dissolution of a corporation upon a 
showing of “oppression.”54  Courts have taken a variety of 
approaches in determining just what constitutes “oppression,” but 
it can generally be defined as a departure from fair play or fair 
dealing.55 
Other courts have made clear that a single fiduciary violation 
is insufficient for a finding of oppression, so that oppression 
justifying dissolution will only be found when there is a continuing 
course of oppressive conduct resulting in disproportionate loss to 
the minority or demonstrating that the majority can no longer be 
trusted.56  However defined, it has been said that the “oppression” 
standard has made it easier for minority shareholders in close 
corporations to obtain relief.57 
3. “Reasonable Expectations.”  In Stefano v. Coppock, Alaska 
adopted the “Reasonable Expectations” test, as laid out by the 
New York Court of Appeals in In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,58 for 
determining whether a minority shareholder in a close corporation 
 
 51. See id. at 1377–78. 
 52. See id. at 1376–77. 
 53. See id. at 1377. 
 54. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-413(b)(2) (LexisNexis 1999); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938(2)(b) (2005).  Other statutes use “unfair” or 
“prejudicial to shareholders” rather than “oppressive.”  See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 
10.06.628(b)(4) (2006); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 1990); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 302A.751 subdiv. 1 (b)(2) (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115 
(2005). 
 55. See, e.g., Polk v. Hergert Land & Cattle Co., 5 P.3d 402, 405 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2000); Churchman v. Kehr, 836 S.W.2d 473, 482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); 
Giannotti v. Hamway, 387 S.E.2d 725, 730 (Va. 1990). 
 56. See, e.g., Kisner v. Coffey, 418 So.2d 58, 61 (Miss. 1982); Baker v. 
Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 507 P.2d 387, 395–97 (Or. 1973). 
 57. See, e.g., Belcher v. Birmingham Trust Nat’l Bank, 348 F. Supp. 61, 148 
(N.D. Ala. 1968); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554, 561 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979). 
 58. 473 N.E.2d 1173 (N.Y. 1984). 
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has been oppressed.59  In Kemp & Beatley, the Court of Appeals of 
New York noted: 
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the 
corporation would entitle him or her to a job, a share of 
corporate earnings, a place in corporate management, or some 
other form of security, would be oppressed in a very real sense 
when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expectations 
and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.60 
The court thus held that a complaining shareholder’s reasonable 
expectations should be used to determine whether a minority 
shareholder in a close corporation has been the victim of 
oppression.61  In making this determination, the court said, courts 
must look at what the majority shareholders knew to be the 
minority’s expectations in joining the close corporation.62 
The Reasonable Expectations test has been adopted in many 
states, although often in slightly modified forms.63  For example, in 
Meiselman v. Meiselman,64 the North Carolina Supreme Court held 
that courts should look at the entire history of the complaining 
minority shareholders’ involvement in determining if oppression is 
present.65  In other words, a court should look at the minority’s 
reasonable expectations not only at the inception of the 
relationship but also as they have evolved over time.66 
Under the Reasonable Expectations test, it is not the case that 
the minority’s disappointment is always tantamount to oppression.  
Rather, oppression will be found only when expectations that were 
central to the minority’s decision to invest in the close corporation 
are violated.67 
 
 59. Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985). 
 60. Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1179. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Besides New York and Alaska, other states that have adopted the 
Reasonable Expectations test include North Carolina, New Jersey, Arkansas, 
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia.  2 O’Neal & 
Thompson, supra note 6, § 9.28. 
 64. 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983). 
 65. Id. at 563. 
 66. See id.  But see Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 556 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) 
(holding that the intensity and content of the duty of loyalty depends on the 
parties’ reasonable expectations at the beginning of the fiduciary relationship). 
 67. In re Wiedy’s Furniture Clearance Ctr., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1985). 
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Some states have explicitly adopted the Reasonable 
Expectations test in their corporate statutes.68  Conversely, the 
highest court in at least one state has declined to adopt the 
Reasonable Expectations test because it was deemed to conflict 
with the state’s dissolution statute, which focused on the actions of 
the majority shareholders, not on the minority’s expectations.69 
Corporate statutes generally provide that a shareholder’s 
remedy for oppression is dissolution.70  However, the corporate 
statutes of several states explicitly allow a court to provide relief 
less severe than dissolution.71  Moreover, many courts have held 
that it is within a court’s equitable powers to order a buyout of the 
complaining shareholder’s shares by the corporation as a remedy 
less extreme than dissolution.72 
III.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE COPPOCK CASES 
In 1961, Robert Crow and two other men, Ralph Stefano and 
C. Harold Gillam, formed a close corporation called Alaska 
Plastics to produce foam insulation at a building in Fairbanks.73  
The three incorporators each held 300 shares of stock and were the 
sole officers and directors of the corporation.74  In 1970, Crow and 
his wife, Patricia Muir, divorced.75  Under the property settlement, 
Muir received one-half of Crow’s interest in Alaska Plastics (a one-
sixth interest in the corporation).76  The three original 
 
 68. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 subdiv. 3 (a) (West 2004); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-115(4) (2005). 
 69. See Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 265–66 
(S.C. 2001) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 (1990)). 
 70. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 3-413(b)(2) (LexisNexis 
1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938(2)(b) (2001). 
 71. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1816 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 13A, § 1123 (1981) (repealed effective July 1, 2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-
310(d) (2006).  Minnesota’s corporate statute allows a buyout to be ordered even 
when the requirements for dissolution have not been proven.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
302A.751 subdiv. 1, 2 (West 2004). 
 72. See, e.g., McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1986); In re Wiedy’s Furniture, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 904 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1985); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388–89 (N.D. 1987); Masinter v. 
Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 439 (W. Va. 1980). 
 73. Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 272 (Alaska 1980). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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incorporators, however, continued to be the sole officers and 
directors of the company.77 
Muir was not notified of the annual shareholders meetings in 
1971, 1972, or 1974, and she received notice of the 1973 annual 
meeting only three hours before it was held.78  In addition, in 1971 
and 1972, when the directors held the shareholders meeting in 
Seattle, the two directors other than Crow brought their wives to 
the meetings at the company’s expense.79 
In 1971, the directors voted themselves an annual director’s 
fee of $3000, which was paid through 1974.80  The directors also 
authorized a $30,000 salary for Gillam as the general manager of 
the company.81  At no time did the directors authorize the payment 
of dividends, and Muir did not otherwise receive money from the 
company.82 
In 1974, the board purchased Broadwater Industries, a 
company producing a product similar to that produced by Alaska 
Plastics, for $50,000.83  Muir was never consulted about the 
transactions, but she did not dissent from a shareholder vote held 
at the 1975 shareholders meeting that ratified all directors’ and 
officers’ acts from the previous year.84  The three incorporators of 
Alaska Plastics also became the sole officers and directors of a 
corporation that was renamed Valley Plastics and made a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Alaska Plastics.85 
At the 1975 shareholders meeting, Muir offered to sell her 
interest in Alaska Plastics for $40,000.86  The board refused and 
instead offered $20,000, which Muir rejected.87  Shortly thereafter, 
the Fairbanks plant burned to the ground, essentially leaving 
Alaska Plastics as nothing more than a holding company for Valley 
Plastics.88 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  In his testimony, Stefano also admitted that bringing the wives to the 
shareholders meeting had no business purpose.  Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. The board had previously offered Muir $15,000 for her shares in 1974.  
Id. 
 88. Id. at 273. 
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Muir sued the directors, bringing a variety of individual and 
derivative claims.89  The trial court found that it was oppressive to 
Muir for her to continue to possess one-sixth of the shares of 
Alaska Plastics.90  Subsequently, the judge ordered that Alaska 
Plastics buy Muir’s shares at their “fair and equitable value” of 
$32,000.91  The directors appealed.92 
A. The First Alaska Supreme Court Case 
In Alaska Plastics, the court noted the unique susceptibility of 
minority shareholders in close corporations to being “squeez[ed]-
out” by the majority due to the absence of a ready market for the 
minority’s shares.93  According to the court, such a dissatisfied 
minority shareholder’s best remedy is usually for the corporation to 
buy her shares at their “fair value.”94  The court focused on two 
circumstances in which a corporation could be ordered to buy a 
minority’s shares. 
The first was upon a petition by the minority for the 
dissolution of the corporation.95  Under Alaska Statute section 
10.05.54096 (which has since been repealed), a court could order 
dissolution of the company upon a showing by a shareholder that 
“the acts of the directors or those in control of the corporation are 
illegal, oppressive or fraudulent” or that “corporate assets are 
being misapplied or wasted.”97  The court noted that dissolution is 
an extreme remedy, in part because it allows minority shareholders 
to “exercise retaliatory oppression against the majority.”98  Citing 
Baker v. Commercial Body Buildings, Inc.,99 the court held that, 
despite the fact that the only remedy provided by the statute was 
dissolution, it was within a court’s equitable powers to order a 
forced buyout of the minority’s shares as a less drastic alternative 
to dissolution.100  Accordingly, the court held that Muir’s request 
for liquidation “could justify the trial court’s order as an equitable 
 
 89. Id. at 273, 278. 
 90. Id. at 273. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 273–74. 
 94. Id. at 274. 
 95. Id. 
 96. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540 (repealed 1988). 
 97. Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 274 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(4)). 
 98. Id. 
 99. 507 P.2d 387, 395–97 (Or. 1973). 
 100. Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 274–75. 
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remedy” if, on remand, Muir could show that the acts of the 
directors were “illegal, oppressive or fraudulent.”101 
The second way in which the court stressed that a corporation 
could in theory be forced to purchase a minority’s shares was as 
“an equitable remedy upon a finding of a breach of a fiduciary 
duty” owed by directors to shareholders.102  The court adopted the 
rule in Donahue that shareholders in close corporations owe each 
other essentially the same fiduciary duty as partners in a 
partnership.103  This fiduciary duty requires that if a controlling 
shareholder takes advantage of a special benefit, the corporation 
must offer the benefit to all shareholders equally.104  The court also 
adopted the similar holding of Ahmanson that majority 
shareholders cannot use their position to obtain benefits not shared 
with the minority.105 
The court reasoned that since none of the Alaska Plastics 
directors sold their shares back to the corporation, an order that 
the corporation purchase Muir’s stock could not be justified under 
Donahue or Ahmanson.106  However, the court did note that the 
directors’ fees, the salary paid Gillam, and the personal expenses of 
the directors’ wives paid for by the corporation could be construed 
as constructive dividends.107  The court remanded the case for a 
determination of whether those payments were in fact constructive 
dividends and thus violated the rule of Donahue and Ahmanson 
because they were not made available to Muir.108  The court held 
that the remedy for a payment of constructive dividends not shared 
with all shareholders is not a forced buyout of the disadvantaged 
shareholders’ shares, but rather the remedy is for the excluded 
payments to be made available to all shareholders.109 
On remand, the trial court found that Muir had demonstrated 
that the acts of the directors were oppressive.110  The lower court 
thus ordered the corporation to purchase Muir’s shares for $32,000, 
 
 101. Id. at 275 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(4)). 
 102. Id. at 274. 
 103. Id. at 276; see Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 328 
N.E.2d 505, 515 (Mass. 1975). 
 104. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 518. 
 105. Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 276 (citing Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 
P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969)). 
 106. See id. at 277. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See id. at 278. 
 109. Id. at 277. 
 110. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 445 (Alaska 1985) (evidenced by 
the judgment in favor of Muir). 
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which the court found to be the fair value of Muir’s shares.111  The 
directors again appealed the case to the supreme court, arguing 
that the court’s Alaska Plastics opinion precluded the lower court 
from ordering the buyout of Muir’s shares.112 
B. The Second Alaska Supreme Court Case 
In Stefano v. Coppock, the supreme court affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court.113  The court held, as it did in Alaska 
Plastics, that courts retain the authority to use their equitable 
powers to fashion remedies less drastic than dissolution.114  The 
court rejected the directors’ contention that a buyout of Muir’s 
shares was actually a more drastic remedy than dissolution, 
reasoning that even if a buyout was more costly than dissolution, it 
was the most appropriate remedy for the harm done to Muir.115 
The Stefano court affirmed, without any elaboration or 
analysis, the lower court’s finding of oppression.116  In a footnote, 
however, the court adopted New York’s Reasonable Expectations 
approach for determining if minority shareholders in a close 
corporation have been oppressed.117 
IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S  
OPINIONS IN ALASKA PLASTICS AND STEFANO 
In Alaska Plastics, the court noted that the salary paid Gillam, 
the directors’ fees, and the payment of the personal expenses of the 
directors’ wives might constitute constructive dividends.118  The 
court held that constructive dividends did not justify a forced 
buyout of Muir’s shares.119  The court also noted that a forced 
buyout of the complaining shareholder’s shares is an available 
remedy for oppression.120  Implicitly, then, the court held that the 
payment of constructive dividends was not by itself sufficient to 
warrant a finding of oppression. 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 445–46. 
 114. Id. at 446. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id  n.3. (“The question has been resolved by considering oppressive 
actions to refer to conduct that substantially defeats the ‘reasonable expectations’ 
held by minority shareholders.” (quoting In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 
1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (citations omitted))). 
 118. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 277 (Alaska 1980). 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. at 275. 
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In adopting the Reasonable Expectations test while 
simultaneously upholding the lower court’s finding of oppression, 
the Stefano court at least implicitly held that the evidence 
supported a finding that Muir’s reasonable expectations were 
violated.121  But if, as the court implied in Alaska Plastics, the 
payment of constructive dividends is not oppression, then the 
oppression must have consisted solely of the failure to allow Muir 
to participate in the management of the business (exemplified by 
the failure to notify Muir of shareholder meetings).122  However, 
there is no reason to suppose that Muir expected to actively 
participate in the management of the business, nor would it have 
been reasonable for her to do so. 
In reaching its conclusions, the Stefano court ignored the way 
in which Muir acquired her shares: through a divorce settlement.123  
Muir was not a typical investor in a close corporation—there was 
no indication that she expected or even desired a job with the 
company.  It seems probable that Muir had no specific interest in 
Alaska Plastics, but rather that she merely received one-half of all 
her husband’s property in the divorce settlement. 
The two ways, short of liquidation, for an investor to receive a 
return on her investment in a close corporation are through 
employment with the company and through dividends.124  Unless a 
minority shareholder is able to secure her rights through a 
shareholders agreement or a supermajority voting provision in the 
charter at the inception of a close corporation, she is always in 
danger of being frozen out: the majority can use its voting power to 
deny her a job and refuse to declare dividends.125  Because Alaska 
Plastics was already up and running when Muir acquired her one-
sixth share, it is doubtful that she had any opportunity to secure 
rights to a return on her “investment” in the corporation.  Thus it 
was arguably unreasonable for her to expect a significant return. 
To the extent that Alaska Plastics was awarding constructive 
dividends to some shareholders but not Muir, Muir certainly 
suffered an injury, the remedy for which, the Alaska Plastics court 
held, was for the dividends to be shared with her.126  But these 
constructive dividends do not constitute oppression under the 
Reasonable Expectations approach unless Muir had reason to 
 
 121. See Stefano, 705 P.2d at 446. 
 122. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d.at 272. 
 123. See id. at 277. 
 124. See 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 6, § 1.09. 
 125. See id. § 1.13. 
 126. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 277. 
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expect dividends, constructive or otherwise, to be paid.127  Thus, it 
seems highly doubtful that Muir had any of her reasonable 
expectations violated.  At the very least, therefore, the Stefano 
court should have explained why a finding of oppression was 
justified under the Reasonable Expectations approach (perhaps by 
finding that Muir was deemed to step into her ex-husband’s shoes).  
Instead, the court provided no analysis at all.128 
The Stefano court’s upholding of a buyout of Muir’s shares can 
be criticized as not being explicitly allowed by statute, but many 
courts in various jurisdictions have upheld a forced buyout as a 
remedy less extreme than dissolution.129  More troubling is the 
court’s unsupported assumption that a buyout is a less severe 
remedy than liquidation.130  The court in Alaska Plastics noted that 
a primary reason a forced buyout is considered less extreme than 
dissolution is that dissolution allows a minority shareholder to 
exercise retaliatory oppression over the majority.131  It seems, then, 
that the court allowed for the possibility of a buyout remedy solely 
because it can provide the minority shareholder with a satisfactory 
remedy in a manner that is less drastic to the majority.  The court 
seems to have ignored its own reasoning, however, in merely 
brushing aside the majority’s argument in Stefano that a buyout 
remedy is not a less drastic remedy than dissolution (perhaps 
because it would be cheaper for the majority to repurchase the 
corporation’s assets at auction than to buy them from Muir).132  The 
court conceded that a buyout may be more costly to the majority 
but noted that a buyout was an effective remedy for Muir.133  By 
focusing on the appropriateness of a remedy from the minority’s 
perspective, the court seems to have forgotten that the very 
purpose of the buyout remedy is its potential to provide a remedy 
less drastic from the majority’s point of view.134 
 
 127. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985).  Besides, as 
already noted, the Alaska Plastics court implied that it did not consider the 
constructive dividends to be oppressive, and the court in Stefano said nothing to 
contradict this.  See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 277. 
 128. See Stefano, 705 P.2d at 446. 
 129. See Sauer v. Moffitt, 363 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984); 21 West, 
Inc. v. Meadowgreen Trails, Inc., 913 S.W.2d 858, 867 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); 
Maddox v. Norman, 669 P.2d 230, 235 (Mont. 1983). 
 130. See Stefano, 705 P.2d at 446. 
 131. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 274. 
 132. See Stefano, 705 P.2d at 446. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 274. 
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V.  THE ALASKA STATUTORY APPROACH 
The Alaskan involuntary dissolution statute that was in place 
at the time of the Coppock cases has been repealed and replaced 
with a statute that exactly parallels the California statute.135  The 
current statute provides that a shareholder holding at least one-
third of the total number of outstanding shares not owned by 
persons guilty of fraud, mismanagement, abuse of authority, or 
persistent unfairness to shareholders can bring suit for involuntary 
dissolution.136  The available grounds for dissolution include: (1) 
that the majority has engaged in the gross misconduct outlined 
immediately above;137 (2) that there is deadlock;138 and, (3) in the 
case of corporations with fewer than thirty-five shareholders, that 
dissolution is reasonably necessary for the protection of the rights 
or interests of the complaining shareholders.139 
Because Muir owned less than one-third of Alaska Plastics’ 
shares, if she were to bring suit under today’s statute, she could 
only sue if the majority had been guilty of fraud, mismanagement, 
abuse of authority, or persistent unfairness.140  Otherwise, she 
would not own the requisite one-third of the shares held by persons 
not guilty of such misconduct.141 
The current Alaska statute on involuntary dissolution is a bit 
confusing.  In order to have standing to sue, a shareholder 
apparently must show what she would hope to prove at trial: that 
the majority has engaged in gross misconduct.142  By contrast, the 
statute in place at the time of the Coppock cases allowed for a 
shareholder to bring an action to liquidate upon a showing that the 
majority had engaged in “illegal, oppressive or fraudulent” 
conduct143 or that corporate assets were being “misapplied or 
wasted.”144 
 
 135. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540 (1988) (repealed 1989).  Compare ALASKA 
STAT. § 10.06.628 (2006) with CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800 (1990). 
 136. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(a)(2), (b)(4) (2006).  The other 
circumstances enabling a suit for dissolution mentioned in the statute do not apply 
to Muir. 
 137. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(4). 
 138. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(2)–(3). 
 139. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(5). 
 140. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(b)(4). 
 141. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(a)(2), (b)(4). 
 142. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628(a)(2), (b)(4). 
 143. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(2) (1988) (repealed 1989). 
 144. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(4) (repealed 1989). 
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The Stefano court adopted the Reasonable Expectations 
approach as a method of determining the existence of oppression.145  
Now that oppression is no longer explicitly an available statutory 
ground for dissolution in Alaska, the issue of the continued 
relevance of the Reasonable Expectations doctrine is unclear.  
Consequently, it is unclear whether Muir would be entitled to a 
buyout of her shares under today’s statute.  Scholars have assumed, 
however, that the Reasonable Expectations test is still good law in 
Alaska.146  Also, the published version of the Alaska Code lists the 
Coppock cases as the sole annotations to section 10.06.628.147 
One thing is clear: the statutes relating to close corporations 
are open-ended enough to enable the supreme court to decide for 
itself the precise circumstances in which a minority shareholder will 
be entitled to relief.  Moreover, given the principle that courts are 
free to fashion equitable remedies less severe than dissolution, 
even when such remedies are not made explicitly available by 
statute, the supreme court is free to determine precisely what form 
of relief is appropriate in a given situation.148 
VI.  WHAT TEST SHOULD ALASKA ADOPT? 
A. The Flaw in the Delaware Approach. 
One need look no further than the Nixon v. Blackwell facts to 
find an example of a situation in which the Delaware approach to 
fiduciary duties owed minority shareholders is flawed.149  Crucial to 
the court’s rejection of the “equal access” principle was the fact 
that minority shareholders have an opportunity when obtaining 
their stock to bargain for protective provisions.150  In addition to 
insisting on provisions in the charter or by-laws, the court noted 
that minority shareholders could enter into shareholders 
agreements providing for, inter alia, buyout provisions and voting 
agreements.151  The court summarized its view as follows: 
The tools of good corporate practice are designed to give a 
purchasing minority stockholder the opportunity to bargain for 
 
 145. See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 (Alaska 1985). 
 146. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable 
Expectations: Of Change, Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 717, 730 n.47 (2002). 
 147. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.628 Notes to Decisions (2006). 
 148. See Stefano, 705 P.2d at 446. 
 149. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1993). 
 150. Id. at 1379–80. 
 151. Id. at 1380. 
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protection before parting with consideration.  It would do 
violence to normal corporate practice and our corporation law to 
fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed 
stockholder buy-out for which the parties had not contracted.152 
The court’s reasoning is persuasive until one takes account of 
the minority shareholder who does not have the opportunity to 
bargain for protections.  This was the very situation in Nixon, and 
yet the court noted this fact only in passing, making no mention of 
the fact that its reasoning was inapplicable to the case at hand.153 
The reasoning in Nixon is likewise inapplicable to the facts of 
the Coppock cases because it is unlikely that Patricia Muir had an 
opportunity to bargain for protections.154  Therefore, Alaska needs 
a test that, unlike Delaware’s approach in Nixon, takes into 
account that not all shareholders in close corporations make a 
conscious decision to invest their capital after having had an 
opportunity to weigh the risks.  Nevertheless, the motivation 
behind the Nixon test is sound: when a frozen-out or oppressed 
shareholder is personally at fault for her own problems due to a 
failure to bargain for protection at the outset of the relationship 
with the other shareholders, a court should be less willing to grant 
her the remedy she requests at the expense of the corporation.155 
B. The Limitations of the Reasonable Expectations Test. 
The Coppock cases do an apt job of demonstrating the 
deficiencies in the Reasonable Expectations approach to 
determining the availability of relief to a minority shareholder in a 
close corporation.  Given that she obtained her shares from her 
husband in a divorce settlement, Patricia Muir, in all likelihood, 
had no expectations, reasonable or otherwise, of receiving 
significant value from her shares in Alaska Plastics.156  And yet it 
seems clear that she was treated unfairly by the company.157  The 
company directors seem to have resented her status as a 
shareholder and to have done all they could to ignore her.158  That 
Muir was not informed of shareholder meetings may not have 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 1379–80.  “A stockholder who bargains for stock in a closely-held 
corporation and who pays for those shares (unlike the plaintiffs in this case who 
acquired their stock through gift) can make a business judgment whether to buy 
into such a minority position, and if so on what terms.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 272 (Alaska 1980). 
 155. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380–81. 
 156. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 272. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
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caused direct material injury to her, but it indicates the attitude of 
the directors to Muir: they had no interest in altering their way of 
doing things to accommodate the new shareholder.159  Using 
company assets to pay for the expenses of directors’ wives may 
have been a sensible practice when all the shareholders of the 
corporation were directors with wives.160  But once Muir came on 
board, this practice clearly became an inappropriate use of 
corporate assets as the majority directors were receiving benefits 
(for which there was no business purpose) to the exclusion of 
Muir.161 
A possible solution to this problem is to modify the 
Reasonable Expectations test to provide that a transferee steps 
into the shoes of the transferor.  In other words, if an action taken 
against a transferee shareholder would have violated the 
transferor’s reasonable expectations, then the transferee’s 
reasonable expectations will be deemed to have been violated.  
However, this solution is not entirely satisfactory; the 
circumstances of a transferor and transferee will invariably differ, 
so a transferor’s expectations often will not be a suitable proxy for 
a transferee’s. 
Another problem with the Reasonable Expectations approach 
is that the extent to which wrongdoing by majority directors is 
required for a finding of oppression and a subsequent order of 
dissolution is unclear.  An investor’s reasonable expectations may 
be betrayed by the majority without any accompanying 
wrongdoing.  For example, the directors of a company may, in a 
manner entirely consistent with the business judgment rule, alter 
the company’s business plan and decide to invest corporate 
proceeds in the acquisition of a new plant or equipment rather than 
in the payment of dividends.  Such actions may violate a minority 
shareholder’s reasonable expectations of short-term dividends, and 
yet it seems harsh for a court to order dissolution of the 
corporation in such a situation.162  Even a buyout of the minority’s 
interests in this situation may be unfair because such a buyout may 
cause the corporation severe short-term liquidity problems.  A 
 
 159. See id. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Courts have indeed held that oppression can be present even when the 
majority directors have complied with the business judgment rule.  See, e.g., 
Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 400 A.2d 554 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1979) (noting that the business judgment rule has failed to curb corporate abusive 
freeze-outs in close corporations); In re Topper, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 363 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1980). 
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court applying the Reasonable Expectations test could resolve the 
issue by holding that it is per se unreasonable for a minority 
shareholder to expect the corporation to forego favorable 
investments merely to avoid disappointing a minority shareholder.  
It seems a better approach, however, would be to explicitly require 
majority wrongdoing in order for dissolution of a close corporation 
to be justified.  After all, the term “oppression” seems to imply the 
presence of wrongdoing. 
Finally, the various formulations of the Reasonable 
Expectations test indicate that the determination of whether a 
violation has occurred depends on the subjective expectations of 
the particular minority shareholder in question (as limited by the 
“reasonable” standard).  This requires that the majority determine 
the expectations of each minority shareholder before deciding 
whether a particular action is proper.  It will often be costly, or 
even impossible, for the majority to obtain this information. 
Thus, the Reasonable Expectations test is workable only if it is 
applied objectively and does not depend on the subjective 
expectations of the minority shareholders.  Even under this 
approach, however, the issue of whether a hypothetical reasonable 
shareholder’s expectations have been violated is inherently vague 
and would need to be fleshed out by case law, something that is in 
short supply in Alaska.  In order to adequately protect the rights of 
minority shareholders without imposing paralyzing levels of 
uncertainty on the majority, Alaska needs an approach that is 
objective but that nevertheless imposes burdens on the party most 
likely to be at fault. 
C. A Proposal for Alaska 
Given the limitations of the Reasonable Expectations 
approach, the issue, then, is what the appropriate remedy is for 
Muir.  There are three basic levels of relief for minority 
shareholders in close corporations.  In increasing order of severity, 
they are: (1) the “equal opportunity” remedy laid down in 
Donahue163 and Wilkes;164 (2) a judicially ordered buyout; and (3) 
dissolution.165 
 
 163. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 519 (Mass. 1975). 
 164. See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663–66 (Mass. 
1976). 
 165. See, e.g., McCauley v. Tom McCauley & Son, Inc., 724 P.2d 232, 236 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 1986); In re Wiedy’s Furniture Clearance Center Co., 487 N.Y.S.2d 901, 
904 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 388–89 (N.D. 
1987); Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 439 (W. Va. 1980). 
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1. “Equal Opportunity” Remedy.  In most instances, an order 
requiring a corporation to share benefits disproportionately 
conferred on the majority with the minority will suffice to remedy a 
minority shareholder’s injury.166  Alaska should use a modified 
version of the test laid out in Wilkes167 to determine when an “equal 
opportunity” violation has occurred.  Recall that under the Wilkes 
test, a shareholder must show unequal treatment by the majority,168 
whereupon the majority has an opportunity to show that there was 
a valid business purpose for the unequal treatment.169  The minority 
then has the opportunity to show that there was a less restrictive 
alternative (i.e., that the majority could have achieved its purpose 
through an alternative less harmful to the minority).170 
Alaska should borrow the general rule from Wilkes that once a 
minority shareholder shows that a disproportionate benefit has 
been conferred on the majority, the minority is entitled to relief if 
there was no valid business purpose for the unequal treatment or if 
there was a less restrictive alternative.  This rule protects the 
interests of a minority shareholder without unduly burdening the 
corporation as a whole.171 
Alaska should modify the Wilkes test so that the burden of 
proof is allocated to the party that is most likely to be the party at 
fault in creating the conflict.  The default allocation of burdens 
should be the same as that laid out in Wilkes: the majority has the 
burden to show that there was a valid business purpose for the 
unequal treatment, whereupon the minority has the burden to 
show that there was a less restrictive alternative. 
However, if the minority shareholder has failed to protect her 
rights through a shareholders agreement, then the minority should 
generally be viewed as the party responsible for the conflict.  
Consequently, the minority should have the burden to show that 
there was no legitimate business purpose for the unequal 
treatment.172  Under this approach, the minority still has the 
opportunity to obtain relief, but the majority is given the benefit of 
the doubt due to the minority’s fault in creating the conflict. 
 
 166. See, e.g., Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 257, 265–
66 (S.C. 2001) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 (1990)). 
 167. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663 (Mass. 1976); see also supra Section I.B.1. 
 168. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 663. 
 172. If unsuccessful, the minority would then still have the opportunity to 
demonstrate a less restrictive alternative. 
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On the other hand, if the minority receives its shares after the 
formation of the corporation because of the majority’s failure to 
place restrictions on the transfer of shares, then it is the majority, 
not the minority, who can blame only itself for the controversy 
arising from a disproportionate benefit given to majority 
shareholders.  In keeping with a fault-based approach, the burden 
should be placed on the corporation to demonstrate not only a 
legitimate business purpose, but also the absence of a less 
restrictive alternative.173  In theory, such an approach could have 
damaging effects on the economy because sound business decisions 
would sometimes be disallowed merely because the corporation 
could not prove that it could not have achieved a legitimate 
objective in some other way.  However, in the long run, this 
approach would provide a further incentive for entrepreneurs to 
plan ahead at the formation of a close corporation to avoid 
potential conflicts that could result from outsiders obtaining part 
ownership in the corporation. 
2. Buyout and Dissolution.  In determining whether a buyout 
or dissolution should be ordered, a starting point is to realize the 
irrationality of insisting that the requirements for an order of 
dissolution first be satisfied before a buyout order is justified as a 
remedy less severe than dissolution.  If a buyout is indeed a less 
severe remedy than dissolution, then it seems reasonable that a 
lesser standard of wrongdoing should have to be shown by a 
complaining shareholder to obtain a buyout remedy than that 
required to justify dissolution.  Alaska should therefore make clear, 
through its supreme court or by statute, that the requirements for a 
buyout are less stringent than those needed for dissolution. 
A judicially ordered buyout of a minority shareholder’s shares 
is a much more severe remedy from the perspective of the 
corporation than an order to share benefits proportionately with 
the minority.  The necessity of freeing up funds to purchase the 
minority’s shares can deprive the corporation of the opportunity to 
pursue other investments and could force the selling off of 
currently held assets. The hardships likely to be faced by close 
corporations ordered to purchase an owner’s shares are 
particularly severe in light of the fact that many close corporations 
are struggling businesses trying to get off the ground.  Society 
certainly has an economic interest in seeing start-up businesses 
succeed and, just as importantly, in encouraging people to invest in 
start-up companies in the first place.  Therefore, the buyout 
 
 173. See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663. 
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remedy should be available only when a pattern of conduct by the 
majority over time makes clear that a minority shareholder cannot 
hope to earn a fair return on her investment because conduct 
depriving her of benefits is likely to continue. 
A court should be reluctant to grant a buyout remedy to a 
minority shareholder whose problems are in part of her own 
making for failure to secure a shareholders agreement to prevent 
unfair treatment by the majority.  Nevertheless, there will be times 
when a minority shareholder will invest her money in a start-up 
close corporation and be ignorant of the ability or even the need to 
protect herself against freeze-out.  If it becomes clear that such a 
shareholder is being persistently taken advantage of by the 
majority, a court should be willing to grant the buyout remedy in 
spite of the minority’s blunder. 
Analogously, a court should be more willing to grant the 
buyout remedy when a corporation has brought the attendant 
problems on itself by failing to restrict the transferability of its 
shares and thereby allowing the shares to fall into the hands of an 
outsider with whom the majority has little inclination to work.  It 
would be going too far to say that, in such a situation, a 
complaining minority shareholder can automatically obtain a 
buyout anytime the majority confers upon one of its members a 
benefit not shared with the minority.  Nevertheless, when a close 
corporation’s problems are of its own making, a court should be 
less sympathetic to any difficulty the corporation may experience in 
summoning sufficient funds to buy back the minority’s shares. 
Dissolution is, as the court in Alaska Plastics noted, a remedy 
which is extremely harsh to the majority because it closes the 
business’s doors.174  Consequently, courts should grant the remedy 
only in extreme circumstances.  Dissolution of the corporation 
should be ordered only when it is clear that, for some reason, the 
buyout remedy is insufficient to cure the minority’s injuries.  This 
situation might exist when, for example, a corporation simply does 
not have enough funds to purchase the minority’s shares at 
anything approaching a fair price. 
Again, the failure of the minority to protect its interests with a 
shareholders agreement should weigh against granting the minority 
relief (in this case, dissolution) at the expense of the majority.  
 
 174. See Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 274 (Alaska 1980).  An 
exception would exist in the case where the minority feels that, as the only bidders 
at an auction of corporate assets, it can start the business up again at a lower cost 
than would be the case in a buyout of the minority’s shares.  Presumably, however, 
this lower cost would come at the expense of the minority.  This should make a 
court even less inclined to grant the dissolution remedy. 
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Likewise, the failure of the majority to protect itself by placing 
restrictions on the transfer of shares should weigh against the 
withholding of relief for the minority. 
VII.  APPLICATION OF THE  
ABOVE PRINCIPLES TO THE COPPOCK CASES 
In obtaining her shares as part of a divorce settlement, it is 
doubtful that Patricia Muir had any opportunity to obtain 
protective provisions to guarantee any return on her interest in 
Alaska Plastics.175 
However, the majority directors probably could have 
prevented Muir from obtaining her shares in the first place by 
placing a consent restraint on its shares.  Alaska allows transfer 
restrictions,176 which can be placed in the charter.177  Most courts 
hold that general restrictions on the transfer of shares apply only to 
voluntary transfers.178  Alaska’s statute makes no distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary transfers of shares.179  However, 
restrictions on transfers by operation of law may be valid if the 
restriction explicitly provides as such.180 
Consequently, under the modified Wilkes test described 
above, once Muir demonstrated unequal treatment, the majority 
directors would have the burden to show both a legitimate business 
purpose for the treatment and that this purpose could not have 
been achieved through means less harmful to Muir. 
 
 175. See id. at 272–73. 
 176. ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.424(a) (2006). 
 177. The restrictions, however, must be “reasonable.”  ALASKA STAT. § 
10.06.210(2). 
 178. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Devick, 735 N.E.2d 153, 162 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2000); see also Mestayer v. Williams, 569 So. 2d 1102, 1106 (La. Ct. App. 1990) 
(holding that stock is part of the community property between husband and wife 
and thus that transfer restrictions on the shares were inapplicable to the wife’s co-
ownership of the shares).  Unlike Louisiana, Alaska is not a community property 
state.  See Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Alaska 1992).  Thus, the 
reasoning in Mestayer is inapplicable to the Coppock cases. 
 179. See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.424(a) (2002). 
 180. See, e.g., Bryan-Barber Realty, Inc. v. Fryar, 461 S.E.2d 29, 31–32 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1995).  In Bryan-Barber, as in the Coppock cases, a wife received her shares 
in a close corporation through a divorce settlement.  Id. at 30.  The court held: 
“[A] restriction on the transfer of stock does not apply to interspousal transfers of 
stock which is marital property absent an express provision prohibiting such 
transfers.”  Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
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Muir would easily be able to demonstrate the existence of 
unequal treatment.181  The majority conferred several benefits on 
itself that were not shared with Muir: the directors’ fees, the salary 
paid Gillam, and the paying of the directors’ wives’ expenses out of 
company assets.182 
For the first two of these unequal benefits, the directors would 
probably be able to demonstrate a legitimate business purpose: to 
encourage productive work on behalf of the corporation.  It is 
doubtful that this incentive could be provided in any way other 
than financial compensation of the directors.  Thus, unless Muir 
could show that the salary or fees were excessive, she likely would 
be unable to show that she was entitled to a Donahue remedy for 
the fees and salary.183 
The payment relating to the directors’ wives, however, is a 
different story.184  It is doubtful that the directors of Alaska Plastics 
would be able to show any legitimate business purpose for the 
payments.185  Even if they could, they would still have to 
demonstrate that this purpose could not have been achieved in a 
way less damaging to Muir.  Theoretically, the directors could 
argue that the companionship of a director’s wife on a business trip 
increases productivity, but this seems to be a stretch.  More likely, 
the corporation would be required to, at the very least, share the 
benefits with Muir.  Muir would have no use for a company policy 
allowing her to bring her spouse with her to shareholder meetings, 
but the payments, as hinted at in the Alaska Plastics opinion,186 
could be construed as constructive dividends, the value of which 
would have to be shared with Muir.  After recompensing Muir, 
Alaska Plastics could cease the payment of constructive dividends 
or share an equivalent dollar amount with Muir. 
A trickier question is whether the harmful conduct by the 
majority was so persistent that it should entitle Muir to a buyout of 
her shares.  Although Muir was treated unfairly by the majority for 
a period of several years,187 a sympathetic court might give the 
company a chance to cease paying constructive dividends to some 
shareholders but not others.  However, the failure of Alaska 
 
 181. See Alaska Plastics v. Coppock, Inc., 621 P.2d 270, 272–73 (Alaska 1980). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 519 (Mass. 1975). 
 184. See Alaska Plastics, 621 P.2d at 272. 
 185. In fact, as noted above, in his testimony, Stefano conceded that there was 
no business purpose for bringing the wives to the shareholders meeting.  Id. 
 186. See id. at 277. 
 187. See id. at 272–73. 
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Plastics to prevent the shares from falling into Muir’s hands should 
weigh against any such leniency. 
The failure to notify Muir of shareholders meetings is a less 
serious problem, given that there is no indication that Muir had any 
interest in the governance of the corporation.188  Nevertheless, as a 
shareholder, Muir had the right to participate in meetings and vote 
on important matters, even if she was guaranteed to be out-voted 
every time.  Therefore, the failure to notify Muir of meetings 
should weigh in favor of a buyout of Muir’s shares. 
In reality, a buyout of Muir’s shares might be beneficial to 
both the majority and the minority.  Although the majority 
directors might face some short-run difficulties in summoning the 
funds to purchase Muir’s shares, in the long run they would 
probably be relieved to no longer have Muir as a shareholder.  
With Muir out of the way, the corporation could continue to pay 
constructive dividends without worrying about offending a non-
director minority shareholder. 
On the facts in the Coppock cases, there does not seem to be 
any justification for dissolution of the corporation.189  Muir’s 
injuries could be redressed just as well by a buyout of her shares at 
their fair value as by a liquidation of the company’s assets. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Alaska could adopt any number of tests that would achieve 
substantially similar results to the test outlined above.  Whatever 
test Alaska decides to adopt, it should ideally make its position on 
the protection of minority rights clear by statute.  Disputes 
involving close corporations might not arise in Alaska very often, 
so it is understandable that the Alaska legislature has not seen fit 
to address these issues.  Thus, it is up to the Alaska Supreme Court 
to step forward and establish clear principles regarding the 
protection of minority shareholders in close corporations. 
Whatever test Alaska adopts regarding the protection of 
minority shareholders in close corporations, there are some general 
principles that should be followed.  In determining the appropriate 
remedy for a complaining minority shareholder, a court should first 
allocate fault between the parties.  The more at fault the majority is 
relative to the minority, the more willing a court should be to give 
the minority a remedy that is damaging to the majority.  Fault can 
take a moral form, such as a violation of fiduciary duty, or a 
 
 188. See id. 
 189. See, e.g., id.; Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 444–45 (Alaska 1985). 
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practical form, such as the failure of the minority shareholder to 
secure her rights through a shareholders agreement. 
Also, Alaska must not be so generous to minority 
shareholders that it risks ruining profitable corporations or 
removing the incentive for entrepreneurs to start their own 
businesses.  The larger economic interests of society must be 
considered. 
With its small population and correspondingly small number 
of close corporations that could potentially be harmed by unwise 
rules of law, the supreme court is in a position to experiment; it 
should not be afraid to adopt a test substantially different than the 
ones present in other states.  By keeping the above principles in 
mind, Alaska can fashion a policy whereby investors—both 
majority and minority—in close corporations know they will be 
treated fairly as long as they act prudently and in good faith. 
